Christopher J. Ellis
Why do commercial lobbying firms exist, and what are the implications of their existence for social welfare? Christopher J. Ellis has constructed a model for the behaviour of commercial lobbying firms. To address the question of social welfare, he has constructed a simple general equilibrium model that includes commercial lobbying firms and that compares the equilibrium obtained under market provision of lobbying services to the first best optimum.
Christopher J. Ellis specialises in applied microeconomic theory, particularly with application to public economics and political economy. His current research agenda focuses on the political economy of economic institutions, including interests in corruption, the economic origins of democracy, the size and number of nations, and the economics of lobbying. With Ifo researcher Silke Friedrich, he is working on projects dealing with public goods and the dissolution of states as well as the dynamics of the dissolution of countries.
Mr Ellis received his PhD in economics from Warwick University and is Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Oregon.