Optimising Tax Compliance

In the wake of the recent global economic slowdown, the need to shore up public revenues has resulted in placing tax evasion high on the political agenda in many countries. How should scarce enforcement funds be allocated to auditing taxpayers? Should tax authorities conduct relatively large numbers of potentially ineffective audits, or focus on doing fewer, but more effective audits? And how does the answer to this question vary with taxpayer income?

During his stay at CES, Matthew D. Rablen will explore the theory of optimal auditing when audits are imperfect at detecting non-compliance, and the degree of audit imperfectness is endogenous.

In addition to researching the determinants of tax compliance, Mr Rablen also focuses on the link between economic quantities and subjective happiness, explaining decision-making under risk with models of behavioural economics and designing voting systems for international institutions. His current research also explores the role of social networks on compliance behaviour, the role of relative income in the utility function and the reform of the UN Security Council.

Matthew Rablen is a Senior Lecturer in Economics at Brunel University, London, a Fellow of the Institute for Fiscal Studies and a former government economist on tax compliance savings policy. He currently teaches behavioural economics and finance to final year undergraduates. He obtained his PhD from the University of Warwick and has published in journals including Economic Journal and Journal of Health Economics.