March 2008
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
Keywords: corruption, prosecution agencies, judicial independence and positive constitutional economics
JEL Classification: [H110] Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government [K400] Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior : General [K420] Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
[Download PDF, 254KB]
Anne van Aaken anne.vanaaken@unisg.ch Lars P. Feld feld@uni-hd.de Stefan Voigt stefan.voigt@uni-hamburg.de
