Migration of people from one country to another and their integration into the society of the destination country constitute a long and complex process. This process begins with the first plan of a person to leave her home country. It does not end until the immigrant stops assimilating and intensifying social networks to natives. This can mean complete assimilation, as in the case of the Huguenots in Prussia, or the formation of a stable minority in the immigration country. The process of migration and integration has multiple economic aspects. For instance, the choice of a destination country for the migration and the decision how strong a person assimilates have important economic components and consequences. In addition, migration and integration do not only have an effect on the migrant and his offspring but also on the populations in the home and destination country. In the introductory part of the dissertation an overview of the economic relevance of migration and integration shall be given. In four self-contained chapters aspects that have not gained much attention by economic research up to now shall be analyzed.
How do migrants choose their destination country? In a joint paper with Silke Uebelmesser and Martin Werding we empirically analyze which factors, especially labor market institutions, determine the destination choice of a migrant. This paper was funded by the Leibniz Community within the initiative “How to Construct Europe”. First results show that, beside wages, unemployment and migrant networks, labor market institutions also have an effect on the migration decision. Especially job security has ceteris paribus a strong incentive effect on migrants. Link
Is there still an immigration surplus, if native education structure adjusts to immigration? Many countries pursue an immigration policy that is targeted at attracting high skilled workers. Borjas (1995) has shown that assuming perfect labor markets immigration leads to a welfare gain for the native population, the so-called immigration surplus. Thus, as the labor market for high skilled workers exhibits few frictions, high skilled immigration should lead to a welfare gain. Nevertheless, this argumentation implicitly assumes that immigration has no influence on the qualification structure of natives. In this paper I show that if natives anticipate high skilled immigration, fewer natives acquire a high education level. In labor markets that are not frictionless this effect can be that strong that high skilled immigration leads to a welfare loss for natives. Moreover, if high skilled migration is expected but not realized, this expectation already generates a welfare loss.
Why are immigrants more affected by labor market fluctuations than natives? It can be observed that cyclical variations at the labor market are much more reflected in the unemployment rates of immigrants than those of natives. This chapter presents possible explanations for the stronger variation. Moreover, it examines their economic relevance using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The lower education and qualification level of immigrants is an important explanation for the stronger variations but not the only one. Different preferences with respect to job security relative to wages and discrimination probably also play a role.
Are there optimal skill requirements for naturalization? Although naturalization is an important step towards the integration of immigrants, up to now there are very few economic papers on naturalization policy. In this chapter the effects of skill requirements for naturalization are analyzed. These requirements affect the skill structure of the immigrant population in a country and also the welfare of natives, as long as the skill structure is connected with the fiscal balance of an immigrant. It is shown that there can be an optimal level of skill requirements for naturalization that is neither extremely high nor extremely low. In a further step the chapter analyzes how this optimal level is affected by other modes of action of naturalization policy. In addition, it is shown that in spite of a selective immigration policy skill requirements for naturalization can still increase native welfare. With regard tot the children of immigrants this implies that a ius sanguinis legislation should be preferred to a ius solis legislation. However, as discussed in the chapter, there are also strong arguments for a ius solis legislation.
